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Following the lead of Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics,' legal scholars have been
obsessed with the countermajoritarian aspects of judicial review.2 Much of
the literature is normative-how can the dilemma of judicial review in a
democracy be reconciled theoretically? In this vast, important, and
sometimes self-important literature, one might, in the whimsical manner of
William Prosser, find examples of arguments ranging from the
philosophical to the lawyerly.4 In contrast, political scientists who study
judicial behavior generally take a descriptive tack, contending that judicial
review is best understood as simply correlating with the political values of
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1. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
2. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five: The Birth of
an Academic Obsession (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
3. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
(1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
4. In reviewing a book on legal philosophy, Prosser wrote, in his inimitable style, of his own
brief study of philosophy:
The principal thing that I remember about philosophy... is the definition of a
philosopher. I am sure that everyone knows it: a philosopher is a blind man in a dark
cellar at midnight looking for a black cat that isn't there. He is distinguished from a
theologian, in that the theologian finds the cat. He is also distinguished from a lawyer,
who smuggles in a cat in his overcoat pocket, and emerges to produce it in triumph.
William L. Prosser, My Philosophy of Law, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 292, 294 (1942) (reviewing MY
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1941)), reprinted in TRIALS & TRIBULATIONS: APPEALING LEGAL HUMOR
1, 3- (Daniel R. White ed., 1989). No, we are not about to cite any examples.
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the Justices' or as representing the strategic behavior of self-interested
actors in a complex institutional setting. 6 One would be hard-pressed in
academe to find many other scholarly areas with so much overlap and so
little congruence.
Generally speaking, judges are probably untroubled by these conflicts,
finding them, if you will, academic. Recently, however, the Supreme Court
has operationalized judicial review in cases concerning congressional
authority to invade state prerogatives, not so much by normative
articulation of constitutional standards as by descriptive evaluation of the
nature and quality of the congressional process underlying the enactment of
the statute. In this respect, the Court has invited a new intersection of legal
scholarship and political science, one concerning the judicial capacity to
evaluate and to control congressional processes under our constitutional
system of separated national powers.
In this Essay, we combine our mutual perspectives to analyze the
Court's performance at this new juncture of constitutional law and political
science. We demonstrate that the Court's intrusion into congressional
processes is not simply too rigorous, but institutionally wrongheaded in a
variety of ways. Whatever might be said about the outcomes in these
federalism cases-and for purposes of this Essay, we remain agnostic on
that score-some of the techniques of judicial review exercised in them are
contrary to any plausible scholarly understanding of Congress as an
institution. Whatever might be said, whimsically or otherwise, about the
Court as philosopher or lawyer, it has flunked political science.
We are not the first commentators to criticize the methodology of the
new federalism cases. Several articles have examined the trend in the case
law, complaining that it, among other things, is contrary to precedent,
wrongly transplants to constitutional statutory review the model of judicial
review of administrative decisionmaking, unfairly retroactively imposes
procedural obligations upon Congress at the expense of the constitutionality
of important legislation, constitutes impermissible judicial interference with
Congress contrary to the separation of powers, and improperly translates
congressional questions of legislative fact into judicial questions of law.'
There is much to admire in these commentaries, and our analysis
5. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
6. See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); FORREST
MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT (2000).
7. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme
Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001); see also Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304 (1999)(critiquing several recent scholarly proposals to resolve the federalism dilemma by imposing a due
deliberation model upon Congress).
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necessarily overlaps with them in many more ways than can be
demonstrated productively by citation within the confines of the essay
format. Our goals are to use our interdisciplinary partnership to advance
this literature in two important ways. First, largely from the perspective of
public-law theory, we situate the federalism cases within broader
jurisprudential frames of reference, examining theories of due process of
lawmaking and the intersection of judicial review and statutory
interpretation. We ask not only whether the theories undermine the cases,
but also whether the cases undermine the theories. Second, largely from the
perspective of social science, we present a focused and detailed
interdisciplinary evaluation of the legislative deliberation model based on a
more complete understanding of congressional decisionmaking processes.
In Part I, we begin by identifying three models of judicial interaction
with the political branches that turn in large part on institutional and
procedural concerns rather than on normative articulation of constitutional
principles. Part H then discusses the federalism cases within the domain of
our study, with particular focus on the judicial review of congressional
processes at the heart of them. These cases appear to fit our third model of
judicial proceduralism-institutionalism, one inquiring whether the political
actor duly deliberated before making the law in question. Part III provides a
thorough evaluation of the "due deliberation" model in the federal cases in
light of the common understanding of Congress found in the social
sciences. We conclude that Congress is capable of meeting the Court's fact-
gathering requirements, but cannot satisfy the Court's requirement of due
deliberation and rational, articulated decision. In our judgment, at least this
aspect of the Court's model is likely to be abandoned eventually. One
reason is that the model is a dysfunctional imposition upon Congress.
Another, more ironic, reason is that the majority coalition of Justices in
these cases was assembled in apparent violation of the very principles of
nonstrategic interaction, deliberation, and articulation of reasoned, sincere
decisions that the coalition has seemingly sought to impose upon Congress.
The concluding portions of the Essay examine some alternatives suggested
in recent literature for the future of judicial review focused on legislative
processes.
1. MODELS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING
We begin by examining a set of judicial techniques that attempt to
ameliorate the supposed tension between judicial review and democracy by
encouraging judges to evaluate the degree to which the policy under
challenge was undertaken by a democratically legitimate actor (usually, a
legislature) through appropriate procedures and with adequate and
articulated deliberation. In theory, these techniques seek to avoid any
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
17092002]
The Yale Law Journal
conclusive judicial evaluation of the value of the policy in question.
Instead, they reflect the idea that judges can force more democratically
legitimate actors to improve the quality of their decisionmaking processes.
Case law and scholarship have suggested three major approaches to
judicial review of this sort.' The institutional legitimacy strand concerns the
identity of the policymaking institution appropriate for a given decision.
For example, a legislature might be viewed as having greater legitimacy
than an administrative agency for making certain constitutionally sensitive
decisions. The procedural regularity variant holds that courts should at
least sometimes require the legislature to follow procedural lawmaking
rules, especially those specified in the constitution under which the
legislature operates. The newest form, which appears in ambiguous ways in
the federalism cases on which we shall focus, is the legislative deliberation
model. This approach requires that the courts scrutinize the quality of the
decisionmaking processes within the legislature that led to the statute under
review.
Similar techniques are familiar to administrative law. Under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),9 administrative action is customarily
subject to judicial scrutiny, under which the reviewing court will often
consider whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to
law.'" If the agency holds trial-type hearings, the court will ask whether
there is substantial evidence in the record to justify the agency's resolution
of the controversy." This is a sort of "due process of law-administration,"
and while mostly rooted in the APA and the judicial common-law practice
preceding and surrounding the statute rather than in the Constitution, it is
taken for granted in contemporary public law.
The techniques we examine in this Essay are a major expansion and
transplantation of these techniques. They amount to a kind of "due process
of lawmaking," under which legislatures would be encouraged by judges to
gather the relevant facts, identify the legal standards applicable to the
context, and reach a reasoned result through appropriate procedures and due
deliberation. At first glance, encouraging the legislature to make better
decisions to which judges will ultimately defer may seem a sensible way to
ameliorate the tension between judicial review and democracy. Upon
reflection, however, at least some of these approaches may seem a strange
8. We rely upon the identification and categorization of these models in DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 118-31 (1991). For a very helpful recent,
exhaustive discussion of these models and possibly related judicial techniques, see Dan T.
Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look
Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1575 (2001).
9. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
10. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
11. See id. § 706(2)(E).
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and empirically unsound attempt to subordinate the primary political
function of legislatures in favor of a deliberative function that legislatures
cannot easily handle and that might, in fact, cause more harm than good.
A. The Model of Procedural Regularity
We owe the term "due process of lawmaking" to Hans Linde, the
distinguished legal scholar and judge. A quarter-century ago, he delivered a
series of now-classic lectures that provocatively criticized some aspects of
the American practice of judicial review.'2 The primary focus of this
analysis was the judicial practice of assessing the rationality of legislation
under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.
Linde understood this inquiry as an instrumentalist view of law demanding
a purely logical linkage between identified legislative goals and the
statutory means chosen to effectuate those goals. For Linde, such judicial
inquiries were misguided. He asserted that rationality review led to a
process of litigation in which counsel defending the law were driven to ad
hoc justifications for the law that may have nothing to do with the
legislative motivation behind it. Moreover, "a law, even at the time it is
enacted, is rarely meant to achieve one goal at the sacrifice of all others" "3
and often reflects policy choices and compromises, practical senses of the
equity of situations, or even sympathy for certain interests, rather than
purely instrumental rationality. 4 Most important for our present purposes,
Linde argued that the instrumentalist model, while capable of meaningful
application in the administrative process, is hopelessly inconsistent with
actual legislative practice and simply could not be forced upon the
legislature by judicial fiat. t" What, then, are the constraints that notions of
12. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).
13. Id. at 208.
14. By way of illustration, Linde hypothesized an Oregon bill that imposed a weight-per-axle
limit on trucks in the interest of highway safety and maintenance, but that allowed a higher limit
for log trucks. The exemption would be adopted not because it promoted highway safety or
maintenance, but because the legislature did not wish to promote those goals in a limitless way
that would hamper an important industry. Is this statutory package "irrational," and therefore
unconstitutional? Linde thought the inquiry silly as formulated, for such a conclusion "means to
deny the legitimacy of the government's policy choice, not its rationality." Id. "[I]n the end, the
constitutional question will be whether the aim of the law is out of bounds, not whether it will
miss its target-a question of legitimacy, not of rationality." Id. at 212.
15. In a representative passage, Linde wrote:
Rational lawmaking, if we take the formula seriously, would oblige this collective body
to reach and to articulate some agreement on a desired goal. It would oblige legislators
to inform themselves in some fashion about the existing conditions on which the
proposed law would operate, and about the likelihood that the proposal would in fact
further the intended purpose. In order to weigh the anticipated benefits for some against
the burdens the law would impose on others, legislators must inform themselves also
about those burdens. These demands on the legislative process imply others. The
projections and assessments of conditions and consequences must presumably take
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due process apply to the legislative arena? For Linde, "process" means
" process" -following the rules laid down for the composition of the
legislature, the behavior of legislators, and the enactment of legislation. 16
Under his theory, therefore, although courts should hold legislatures to the
procedural rules laid down for their lawmaking, courts should not inquire
about the quality of legislative deliberation surrounding the adoption of
legislation.
As Linde acknowledged, there is relatively little support in the case law
for his kind of due process in lawmaking. In large part, this is probably due
to the problem of remedy: If a legislature fails to follow the rules, it might
be too draconian for a court to invalidate the law that resulted. Yet there are
examples of the application of the model of procedural regularity. In the
states, courts grapple with this model when they consider the common state
constitutional requirement that a law contain only one subject.17 The single-
subject rule has been enforced by state supreme courts relatively rarely-in
part because the definition of a single subject is difficult and rather easily
defeated by speaking in abstract terms (e.g., "appropriations," rather than
"funding for higher education"), in part because the rule might seem to
interfere unduly with ordinary legislative conduct such as logrolling."8
Nonetheless, in recent years the state supreme courts are becoming more
aggressive in enforcing the single-subject requirement, especially in the
context of ballot measures submitted to the people through the initiative
process. 9 The best federal example of the model of procedural regularity is
probably Powell v. McCormack,2" in which the Supreme Court invalidated
some account of evidence, at least in committee sessions. A member who never attends
the committee meetings should at least examine the record of evidence before casting a
vote, or be told about it, and should certainly never vote by proxy. The committee must
explain its factual and value premises to the full body. Surely there is no place for a
vote on final passage by members who have never read even a summary of the bill, let
alone a committee report or a resume of the factual documentation. In the forty-nine
states which are less progressive than Nebraska [Linde is lecturing at the University of
Nebraska!], the second house of the legislature could hardly substitute a wholly
different version of the bill without repeating the process of inquiry. These kinds of
demands are implicit in due process, if lawmakers are really bound to a rule that laws
must be made as rational means toward some agreed purpose.
Id. at 223-24.
16. Linde acknowledged that judges may be reluctant to invalidate legislation on this ground,
although he urged them to do so. In any event, that is a "problem[] of judicial review, and in our
present theoretical excursion [that is] secondary to what the Constitution demands of lawmakers.
We do not assume that a law has been constitutionally made merely because a court will not set it
aside . !..." Id. at 243.
17. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Casefor a Truth-
in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957; Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional
Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITr.
L. REV. 797 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 351 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
19. See, e.g., Senate of Cal. v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089 (Cal. 1999); Fine v. Firestone, 448 So.
2d 984 (Fla. 1984).
20. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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the expulsion of a member of Congress because of procedural defects.
Other illustrations include INS v. Chadha,21 invalidating the legislative veto
as inconsistent with the constitutional procedural requirements of
congressional lawmaking, and Clinton v. New York,22 striking down the
line-item veto.
B. The Model of Institutional Legitimacy: Structural Due Process and
Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Writing in the same era as Linde, a young Laurence Tribe coined
another term, "structural due process." 23 Tribe focused on the "structures
through which policies are both formed and applied." 24 We understand this
inquiry to include a hierarchical component, which requires that certain
kinds of constitutionally sensitive decisions be made only by governmental
institutions with special legitimacy. Judicial decisions that strike down the
action of inferior institutions amount only to "suspensive vetoes" because a
superior institution can reinstate the policy in question. For Tribe, therefore,
judicial review includes an inquiry about institutional legitimacy.
The best-known example is the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.25
Although by its terms the Commerce Clause only delegates to Congress the
authority to regulate interstate commerce, courts have inferred from the
constitutional structure a prohibition upon state regulation unduly
interfering with interstate commerce. Because this amounts to merely a
judicial assumption of what Congress intends as a matter of national
economic policy, however, if Congress authorizes such state regulation, the
courts will defer.
There are several other, more obscure, examples of this approach in
American case law. For example, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,26 the
Court considered the Federal Civil Service Commission's bar of
noncitizens from federal employment. Had a state adopted the same rule for
its employees, it would have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.27 The Supreme Court often subjects federal
classifications based on sensitive criteria to equal protection review under
the aegis of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which, unlike
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
22. 524 U.S. 417 (1998); cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (finding
justiciable the question of whether appropriations legislation originated in the House of
Representatives, as required by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. I).
23. See Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 269
(1975).
24. Id. (emphasis omitted).
25. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1029-43 (3d ed.
2000).
26. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
27. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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the Fourteenth Amendment, does apply to the federal government.28 But
federal classifications based on alienage are exempted from this strict
review, on the ground that there are surely legitimate reasons why the
federal government, as opposed to the states, might consider alienage
relevant.29 For example, in Mow Sun Wong the federal government
contended that its prohibition on alien federal employment could serve as a
bargaining chip in foreign relations or to encourage noncitizens to become
citizens. But none of the proffered reasons was the business of the Civil
Service Commission, as opposed to Congress or the President, neither of
which had ever considered the question. The Court invalidated the rule but
stated that the same approach might be constitutional if explicitly adopted
by the President or Congress."
Another illustration is Kent v. Dulles,3 which involved a challenge to
the denial of passports to alleged subversives by the State Department. The
Court avoided the constitutional issues by narrowly interpreting the statutes
delegating to the Secretary of State responsibility over passports. Because
the statutes did not explicitly authorize the Secretary to consider beliefs or
associations in the passport process, the Court held that he lacked that
authority.32
Kent and Mow Sung Wong are consistent with several well-established
canons of statutory interpretation that shape legal construction based on
latent constitutional values. 3 The most general of these is the "avoidance
canon," under which a court is instructed to avoid a serious constitutional
issue if the statute can be plausibly construed to have another meaning that
does not raise the question.34 A particular instantiation of this is the
nondelegation canon. In theory, wide-open delegations of legislative
authority to administrative agencies (like the Department of State in Kent
and the Civil Service Commission in Mow Sun Wong) raise serious
constitutional questions under our separation of powers, for they allow
28. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
29. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
30. Indeed, when President Ford reinstated the exclusionary rule by executive order, the
lower courts upheld its constitutionality, and the Supreme Court denied review. See Mow Sun
Wong v. Hampton, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Lum v. Campbell, 450
U.S. 959 (1981).
31. 357 U.S. 116(1958).
32. Despite President Eisenhower's urgent call for congressional action explicitly authorizing
the State Department to act in this fashion, no legislation was ever enacted. See Daniel A. Farber,
National Security, the Right To Travel, and the Court, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 263, 278-8 1.
33. On such canons, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593
(1992); and Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
407 (1989).
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander
Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 71; Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945
(1997).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1714 [Vol. I111: 1707
Congressional Process
agencies rather than legislatures to make law. The Supreme Court in 1935
twice invalidated statutes on this ground,35 but has never again done so. In
recent years, it has explained that the problem can be dealt with by narrow
interpretation of broad delegations in light of legislative history and
purposes, such that courts can construct limits to the delegated authority
within which the agency must operate.36
Mow Sun Wong, Kent, and the avoidance and nondelegation canons
demonstrate judicial techniques designed to enforce what Larry Sager has
called "underenforced constitutional norms." 37 For example, in Mow Sun
Wong, the constitutional value at stake--equality-had already been
judicially recognized as significant in the context of discrimination against
aliens, but only when states (which rarely have any legitimate reason to
consider citizenship) have acted. Sager noted that the two proffered federal
reasons for considering alien status-foreign policy and encouraging
citizenship--were both potentially quite substantial and especially difficult
for judges to assess because, among other things, judges lack the requisite
background information and sense of past and future policy direction. 8 In
this context, it would be unsurprising to find judges, for institutional
reasons, "underenforcing" the equality norm by broadly deferring to the
President or Congress if one or the other took alienage into account. But the
Civil Service Commission, which has no role in foreign policy or
citizenship, made the exclusionary rule, and thus there was no reason to
assume that the federal government had appropriately weighed the relevant
factors. The Court's decision in Mow Sun Wong "seems entirely
appropriate: it in effect constitutes a remand to the decisionmaking body to
make appropriate policy judgments for an initial assessment of the validity
of the enactment." 39 Kent is surely similar: The political branch balancing
the First Amendment and foreign-travel rights of politically unpopular
citizens against foreign and domestic policy concerns about subversion in
the charged political climate of the 1950s should be Congress, not the
Secretary of State or his subordinates.
In a few unusual contexts, the Court has applied canons of
interpretation to protect values that the Court would not directly protect by
constitutional review. As mentioned, the nondelegation canon is the most
obvious example. In addition, in the idiosyncratic areas of federal
35. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
36. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 53t U.S. 457 (2001); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000).
37. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
38. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1411-18 (1978).
39. Id. at 1417.
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immigration law and federal Indian law, the Supreme Court has accorded
Congress a "plenary power" to act-in essence, for institutional reasons,
the Court has deemed itself incompetent to second-guess the judgments of
Congress about who should be admitted to our polity and how those who
were originally not of our polity, but were here in the first place, should be
governed.' In both areas, however, canons of construction encourage a
narrow interpretation of federal law that invades Native or alien interests
and prefer a generous to a harsh construction unless the law clearly
provides for the contrary.41
C. The Model of Due Deliberation
One of the central aspects of the countermajoritarian difficulty is
reconciling judicial displacement of legislative decisions. If constitutional
law seeks to protect fundamental societal values that transcend the clear
mandates of the Constitution, it seems difficult, from the perspective of
democracy, to justify a judicial rather than legislative determination of what
counts as a fundamental social value. Nonetheless, some legislative
judgments on fundamental values may be more trustworthy than others, and
courts might be able to assist Congress in this process. So argued Terrance
Sandalow, who built upon the hierarchical idea of structural due process by
adding to it a deliberative element:
[I]f governmental action trenches upon values that may reasonably
be regarded as fundamental, that action should be the product of a
deliberate and broadly based political judgment. The stronger the
argument that governmental action does encroach upon such
values, the greater the need to assure that it is the product of a
process that is entitled to speak for the society. Legislation that has
failed to engage the attention of Congress, like the decisions of
subordinate governmental institutions, does not meet that test, for it
is likely to be the product of partial political pressures that are not
broadly reflective of the society as a whole.42
40. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31
(1996) (examining the relationship between the plenary power over immigration and the plenary
power over Indian affairs).
41. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).
42. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1188
(1977). For more recent commentary proposing a somewhat similar model for judicial review of
congressional intrusions upon the values of federalism, see Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 795 (1996); and Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and
the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180 (1998).
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Note that Sandalow focused not on the rationality of all legislation, but
on whether particular legislation encroaches on fundamental constitutional
values. The approach suggests that, in circumstances in which a statute
would otherwise be unconstitutional, special congressional attention to the
relevant values could save it. Note also that Sandalow left unanswered what
this might entail: Is it sufficient if the issue engages the attention of
Congress, or must Congress also provide documentary evidence
demonstrating that it duly deliberated on the relevant issues before reaching
a reasoned result?
Until recently, the model of legislative deliberation had little effect on
constitutional law. Justice Stevens, the author of Mow Sun Wong, has
occasionally provided some support for the due deliberation model.43 More
obliquely, the model may have influenced the evolution of equal protection
law on gender issues.' Furthermore, the model may be at least somewhat
43. The most obvious examples arise from his dissenting opinions in two cases. In Delaware
Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), the Court upheld a congressional plan
of distributing assets to the descendants of the Delaware Nation. Justice Stevens dissented on the
ground that Congress had excluded some descendants by sheer oversight. Stevens explicitly
invoked the term "due process of lawmaking" in his dissent. ld. at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
More vividly, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a federal statute
requiring that at least ten percent of the federal funds for public works projects be set aside for
minority business enterprises. Justice Stevens again dissented, finding nothing in the legislative
history to justify the statute's approach of assuming that six subclasses of minorities (defined as
"Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts") merited federal
reparations or other special treatment, much less identical treatment. Id. at 535 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Unlike the other dissenters, Justice Stevens was "not convinced that the [Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment] contains an absolute prohibition against any statutory
classification based on race." Id. at 548. He could not, however, countenance a legislative process
that had not even noted that the statute was the first time in the nation's history that Congress
"hald] created a broad legislative classification for entitlement to benefits based solely on racial
characteristics." Id. at 549. He observed that on the House and Senate floors "only a handful of
legislators spoke" on the matter and that "it is unrealistic to assume that a significant number of
legislators read" a committee report that addressed the minority set-aside and was relied upon by
the Court's majority. Id. at 550 & n.25. Justice Stevens concluded that the lack of due deliberation
counted against the constitutionality of the measure. He stated:
Although it is traditional for judges to accord the same presumption of regularity to the
legislative process no matter how obvious it may be that a busy Congress has acted
precipitately, I see no reason why the character of their procedures may not be
considered relevant to the decision whether the legislative product has caused a
deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Whenever Congress
creates a classification that would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it had been fashioned by a state
legislature, it seems to me that judicial review should include a consideration of the
procedural character of the decisionmaking process. A holding that the classification
was not adequately preceded by a consideration of less drastic alternatives or
adequately explained by a statement of legislative purpose would be far less intrusive
than a final determination [of unconstitutionality].... [Tlhere can be no separation-of-
powers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a failure to
follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental
constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.
Id. at 550-52 (citations omitted).
44. A statute that takes gender into account on its face is subject to an intermediate sort of
scrutiny, under which the statute is unconstitutional unless it serves important government
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related to the notion that laws expressing animosity toward a disfavored
group may be unconstitutionally irrational.45 It has been in the
contemporary federalism cases, however, that this model has come to the
fore with a vengeance, as the next Part explains. 6
II. DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING, THE REHNQUIST COURT,
AND FEDERALISM
Due process of lawmaking, in ways far transcending Linde's original
conception, has been the hallmark of the current Supreme Court under
Chief Justice Rehnquist in its most controversial area, federalism. In the
fifteen years of the Rehnquist Court, the law has changed dramatically in
ways limiting federal power over states and their citizens. Some of these
developments have involved constitutional invalidation of federal law,
while others have featured the application of newly formulated canons of
statutory interpretation that narrow the reach of federal law. The general
outlines of the story are well known,47 so we shall be concise.
interests and is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In at least two cases, the Court has said that congressional procedure and
deliberation influenced the constitutional outcome. In upholding the exclusion of women from
selective service, the Court stressed that Congress had "carefully considered and debated" the
alternatives. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981). In contrast, in striking down a federal
Social Security measure favoring widows over widowers, a plurality of the Court acknowledged
that a compensatory purpose of protecting widows, who may well be more economically
disadvantaged than widowers, might have supported the statute, but noted that there was no
indication of any "reasoned congressional judgment" along those lines. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 214 (1977).
45. One might think of these as the "undue misdeliberation" cases. In United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), the Court invalidated an exclusion
from the food-stamp program of households containing unrelated persons. The Court purported to
base its holding on the lack of any rational connection between the distinction drawn (households
of related persons versus those containing one or more unrelated persons) and the statute's stated
purposes of alleviating hunger. In fact, the legislative history revealed that the exclusion was
designed to prevent "hippie communes" from taking advantage of the food-stamp program, and
thus the statute was not "irrational"-there was a rational relationship between a legislative
purpose and the means chosen to effectuate that purpose. But the Court ruled that such a purpose
was inadmissible because it was illegitimate: "For if the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."
Id. at 534. To the same effect is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985), involving a city's attempt to "zone out" a group home for the mentally disabled. Most
recently and most visibly, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court invalidated a
Colorado constitutional amendment, adopted by the voters, which, though ambiguous, seemed
designed to make gays and lesbians second-class citizens by repealing local ordinances protecting
them against discrimination and largely preventing the readoption of similar measures.
46. The Court has also alluded to something like a deliberation model in a few recent cases
outside the federalism context. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause After
Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 843 (2000); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 33; Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
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In 1986, when Justice Rehnquist was elevated to Chief Justice, the
Constitution imposed virtually no cognizable constraints upon
congressional authority to legislate concerning local matters. The Court had
let stand the federal regulation of local conduct as an exercise of Congress's
authority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states" 4 in such
cases as Perez v. United States, 9 upholding a federal statute criminalizing
local loan-sharking, and Katzenbach v. McClung,0 upholding a federal
statute prohibiting racial discrimination by restaurants if "a substantial
proportion" of their food has moved in interstate commerce, as applied to a
local restaurant that had purchased $150,000 worth of food in the prior
year, around $70,000 of which was meat that had been shipped interstate. In
both cases, the Court simply deferred to congressional "findings" -formal
ones written into the statute (Perez) or informal ones gleaned from a
judicial examination of the legislative history (McClung)-that the federal
regulation was connected to interstate commerce. In each case, the Court
did not view the defendant in isolation, but instead found the necessary
interstate commerce component by aggregating the activities of all similarly
situated loan sharks or restaurants, under the principle of Wickard v.
Filburn,5 ' which had upheld the application of a federal agricultural statute
imposing a quota upon wheat production to one farmer who had fed his
excess wheat to his own animals.
Nor would the Court, at the dawn of the Rehnquist era, even prevent
Congress from regulating the states as entities. Congress could bring states
into federal line by carrot, by conditioning federal funding to states upon
their agreeing to the specified terms. For example, in South Dakota v.
Dole,52 a case decided at the beginning of the era of the Rehnquist Court
and written by Rehnquist himself, the Court upheld the conditioning of five
percent of federal highway funds upon the state's agreement to raise the
drinking age to twenty-one. More controversially, Congress could even
regulate the states by stick. In a case decided two years earlier, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 3 the majority upheld the
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA' s) minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions to state employees across the board. The Court
thereby overruled National League of Cities v. Usery,' which had held that
Congress had no authority under its commerce power to interfere with the
REv. 215 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
49. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
50. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
51. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
52. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
53. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
54. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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"States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions,"55 thus preventing application of the FLSA to
certain state employees performing "core state functions."
The one significant area where federalism limited congressional
authority involved the states' immunity, under the Eleventh Amendment,
from suit in federal court. The year before Rehnquist became Chief Justice,
the Court concluded that "Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making
its intent unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 5 6 In this way
the Court had transformed a more modest canon of statutory interpretation
that created a presumption against congressional abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity into a new "clear statement
rule.""7  This was no doubt a constitutionally informed statutory
interpretation ruling, but when faced with a direct attack upon the
constitutionality of congressional abrogation of the states' immunity, the
Court blinked. In 1989 the Rehnquist Court upheld congressional power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its authority to
regulate interstate commerce. 8 When this decision was coupled with the
Court's earlier holding that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce
substantive Fourteenth Amendment rights such as due process and equal
protection,59 it was apparent that, at the dawn of the last decade, the states
had virtually no protection against clear congressional invasions of their
authority.
The 1990s saw a radical transformation of this area of law, in terms of
both constitutional interpretation and statutory construction, as the Court
embarked on a mission to defend states' rights and limit congressional
power. The crusade began with the kinder and gentler mode of modifying
statutory construction canons. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,' the Court blunted
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, recognized in Garcia, to
regulate the states as states by imposing an Atascadero-like clear-statement
rule providing that federal statutes do not regulate important state functions
unless they clearly so provide. Again, as in Atascadero, the Court replaced
a longstanding canon of milder force that merely presumed against such
legal effect but allowed a consideration of legislative history, statutory
purpose, and other factors in addition to statutory text to override that
presumption. The next year, the Court took up the constitutional cudgel,
55. Id. at 852.
56. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (emphasis added).
57. On the potential interpretive effects of canons (tiebreakers, presumptions, and clear-
statement rules), see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 33.
58. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
59. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
60. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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concluding that principles of federalism immunized state legislatures from
being commandeered to implement federal programs. 1 Much more
dramatically, in 1995 the Court for the first time in sixty years held that a
federal statute regulating the citizenry exceeded congressional authority
under the commerce power. United States v. Lopez,62 by a 5-4 vote,
invalidated the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990,63 which
prohibited possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school, on the ground
that the statute had nothing on its face to do with commerce, contained no
congressional findings linking it to commerce, and had no obvious
connection to commerce. The Court concluded that the statute could be
linked to interstate commerce only in roundabout ways insufficient to
justify congressional commerce authority.'M
After Gregory and Lopez, it still seemed possible that the Court was
leaving Congress breathing room to accomplish national goals at the
expense of the states and local autonomy, as long as Congress engaged in
due process of lawmaking by drafting statutes carefully and documenting,
either by formal or informal findings, a connection between interstate
commerce and the federal statute in question. Indeed, Lopez suggested that
formal findings would be helpful when the basis for legislative power was
not "visible to the naked eye." 65 In the seven years following Lopez,
however, the implications for due process of lawmaking concerning
federalism have become clearer as the Court has continued to cabin
congressional power.
While Lopez put new limits on the commerce power generally, in 1996
the Court imposed a substantial constraint on Congress's authority to reach
admitted economic activities of the states. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida,'
the Court overruled Union Gas and held that Congress has no authority
under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of the states from suit for damages in federal court by private
61. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997), the Court held that state executive officials were likewise immune from federal
commandeering.
62. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
64. The majority acknowledged, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-68, and Justice Breyer in dissent
explained at length, id. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting), that a causal connection between the
statute and interstate commerce could be made. In brief, guns near schools lead to violence near
schools; school violence causes economic loss spread throughout the economy through insurance;
school violence affects where people choose to live, including those moving across state lines;
school violence undercuts educational performance, hurting the economy; and so on. The majority
refused to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States." Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 563. For speculations on the role of legislative findings in the aftermath of Lopez,
see Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication,
and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695 (1996).
66. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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parties. The Court articulated a chronological explanation for congressional
abrogation power: Article I powers such as the commerce power do not
override the Eleventh Amendment (which of course was adopted later), but
Congress has the authority under post-Eleventh-Amendment delegations of
power, such as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, because the later-adopted
provisions impliedly repealed that immunity. As a practical matter,
Seminole Tribe shifted most of the action away from the Commerce Clause
to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, because now only the latter
authorizes Congress to subject states to damages suits by private parties in
federal court for violation of federal statutory commands.67
The next year, the Court continued to implement the new federalism by
narrowly interpreting this crucial Section 5 power. In City of Boerne v.
Flores," it held that Congress had no authority under Section 5 to enact the
provisions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),69 which
required state and local governments to accommodate religious groups that
were substantially burdened by regulation. Boerne held that Section 5
authorized Congress to legislate only to remedy or to prevent judicially
cognizable violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to rewrite the
substantive limits the Amendment imposes upon the states. The statute ran
afoul of this approach because it protected religious groups from regulation
that posed no serious risk of constituting judicially cognizable
constitutional violations. Regulations that burden religion but are neutral on
their face with respect to religion violate the Constitution only if the
regulations are contaminated by a governmental intent to harm religion.7"
The Court searched the legislative history in vain for documentation of a
linkage between the statutory breadth and such judicially cognizable
constitutional violations, much less for strong reasons to suppose that the
statute's protections that went beyond the limitations the Constitution itself
imposed on the states were "proportional and congruent" to preventing
actual constitutional violations.7
Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Boerne put a triple whammy on
congressional authority, but seemed to suggest that due process of
lawmaking was a way out of the bind. A more carefully considered statute,
with formal findings and legislative history to back it up, might persuade
the Court to uphold a statute applying to the citizenry adopted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause or a statute regulating the states adopted pursuant to
67. Nor may Congress use the commerce power to subject states to damages suits in state
courts for alleged breach of federal statutory commands. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
68. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
70. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
71. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-36.
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Section 5. Boerne, in particular, was subject to this understanding, for it
contrasted the inadequate congressional record supporting RFRA with the
thorough documentation of a pattern of judicially cognizable violations of
African-American voting rights contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment that
Congress generated to support the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.72
Several problems immediately arose from this approach. The Court
imposed these requirements retroactively upon existing statutes, which
were of course enacted in a different time, when Congress had no notice of
the necessity of generating a carefully crafted legislative history. Moreover,
if the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act is the baseline against
which all other civil rights legislation must be measured, Congress may be
in big trouble. We know of no other statute passed under Congress's
authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments that is supported by
such a thorough and well-documented record of a pattern of the denial of
constitutional rights. It is therefore not surprising that, even when Congress
did a more thorough job than it had with RFRA in documenting the basis
for such statutes, the Court still found them wanting.
The Section 5 cases following Boerne have uniformly struck down the
federal statutes in question. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank73 held that Congress exceeded its
authority under Section 5 in subjecting states to suit for patent infringement.
The Court concluded that a patent could be "property" protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The only way states
could deny that property right without "due process of law," however,
would be to fail to provide adequate state remedies for state deprivations of
that right, and the legislative history of the statute showed no attempt to
document systematic state failure to provide such remedies. The Court
suggested that Congress must find "a history of 'widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights"'"74 in order to justify its exercise of
Section 5 authority. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissenters, objected to
no avail that the legislative record included several references to the
inadequacy of state remedies for patent infringement by the states and a
claim that instances of infringement were likely to become more frequent as
states undertook more commercially related activities. 75 He added that the
states chose not to testify in opposition to the 1992 legislation
6
72. Id.
73. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
74. Id. at 645 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526).
75. Id. at 655-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 664-65.
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More dramatically, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents," the Court
held that Congress had gone beyond its Section 5 power in subjecting states
to damages suits by their employees under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.78 Distinctions based on age rarely violate the Equal
Protection Clause because they are subject only to minimal rational basis
review."9 The statute outlawed far more such distinctions in employment
than the Constitution would. Accordingly, the Court undertook a searching
review of the legislative history to see whether the broader remedies were,
in the language of Boerne, "congruent and proportional" prophylactic
methods of preventing such constitutional violations. The Court concluded:
Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.
Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the
States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the
level of constitutional violation. The evidence compiled by
petitioners to demonstrate such attention by Congress to age
discrimination by the States falls well short of the mark. That
evidence consists almost entirely of isolated sentences clipped from
floor debates and legislative reports.80
Here the Court imposed its new, stringent fact-gathering obligations upon a
Congress adjourned for more than a quarter-century.
Later in the same Term, in the only post-Lopez Commerce Clause case
to date, the Court seemed to indicate that due process of lawmaking
concerns are less relevant in that area than Lopez implied. In United States
v. Morrison,s l the five federalism Justices struck down the civil remedy
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which had
provided a federal cause of action for the victim of a "crime[] of violence
motivated by gender." 8 The majority easily disposed of the Section 5
argument by concluding that Section 5 provided Congress no authority to
regulate private conduct, as here, where the defendant in the action for
damages was not a state official.83 The Commerce Clause issue was not
handled so neatly. The majority acknowledged that the legislative history of
VAWA contained "numerous findings regarding the serious impact that
77. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
79. The theory is that taking age into account is ordinarily a rational act for government
decisionmakers that is rarely rooted in animus. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976).
80. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89.
81. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
83. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27.
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gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families,"' including
the conclusion that
gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce "by
deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging
in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with
business, and in places involved in interstate commerce;.., by
diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other
costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate
products." "
Rather than quarrel with the factual predicate for this conclusion, the
majority found it inadmissible because it was based on the same flaw as the
predicate argument in Lopez. Allowing such a but-for causal connection
from one violent act to the nationwide, aggregated impact of such crimes on
interstate commerce would essentially allow Congress to regulate any local
crime or other activity, in violation of the strategy of federalism embedded
in Article I and the Tenth Amendment.86
Morrison suggests that the nationwide, aggregated effects of local acts
bring them within Congress's commerce power only when those acts have
an economic quality to them.87 Even if this is correct, however, it seems
likely that due process of lawmaking concerns, such as formal findings and
documented legislative history, will be important to justify new federal
statutes regulating local activities where either the local commercial aspects
or the nationwide aggregated effects on interstate commerce may be
unclear. Left unsaid in Morrison was a positive statement of the kind of
legislative record required to satisfy the Court.
For our purposes, the most striking post-Boerne Section 5 case is the
most recent: Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.8" In
Garrett, the five Justices who have bloc-voted to reestablish federalism
limits on Congress struck down the provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act89 that subjected states to damages suits by their employees
claiming discrimination because of disability. As in Kimel, the majority
stressed that classifications based on disability are subject only to minimal
rational basis review. Unlike in Kimel, however, the Court faced
congressional findings of pervasive discrimination against the disabled and
an elaborate legislative history recounting instances of such discrimination.
84. Id. at 614.
85. Id. at 615 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994)).
86. See id.
87. The majority squarely rejected "the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregated effect on interstate
commerce." Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
88. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
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The Court applied to the legislative history a time-honored lawyerly
shredding technique, the piecemeal critique, in which the evidence was
examined in segmented fashion rather than for its cumulative impact. For
example, the Court noted the report of the Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities. The Court discounted the
significance of the report because it did not constitute a congressional
finding and it was not clear that Congress had relied on the task force's
findings. The Court complained that evidence of state discrimination was
"submitted not directly to Congress but to the Task Force.""9
The Court stressed that the only legislative history that counted for
Section 5 purposes was that found in the record of congressional action that
documented actual constitutional violations by states against disabled
employees-evidence from the private sector or even from local
governments (which are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity),
even if it revealed the rankest discrimination against disabled workers, was
declared irrelevant." The Court did acknowledge six incidents recounted in
the legislative history and cited by counsel that might have amounted to
constitutional violations by states against the disabled.92 (In dissent, Justice
Breyer argued that the legislative history contained far more such
evidence.)93 The majority concluded that "these instances taken together
fall far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on which Section 5 legislation must be based."'94
Furthermore, the majority stated, "had Congress truly understood this
information as reflecting a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the
States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act's
legislative findings. There is none.""s Specifically, the House and Senate
committee reports offered summary statements that did not explicitly
mention states.96 On that basis, the Court asserted that "there is also strong
evidence that Congress' failure to mention States in its legislative findings
addressing discrimination in employment reflects that body's judgment that
no pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented."97 This
contrasted, in the majority's view, with Congress's preparation of the
Voting Rights Act-a legislative history now elevated to almost mythic
meticulousness-where "'Congress explored with great care the problem
of racial discrimination in voting."' 98 Finally, the majority concluded, even
90. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 369-70.
93. See id. at 377, 389-424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. i at 370 (majority opinion).
95. Id. at 371.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 372.
98. Id. at 373 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966)).
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if a sufficient pattern of unconstitutional action had been established, the
statutory remedies requiring accommodation of the disabled were not,
under the Boerne test, "congruent and proportional" to remedying past, or
preventing future, unconstitutional conduct.9
Justice Breyer, joined in dissent by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, not only contested the majority's claim of inadequate evidence of
adverse treatment by state officials, but went further by providing an
institutional critique as well. Justice Breyer noted that " It]he Court's failure
to find sufficient evidentiary support may well rest upon its decision to hold
Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary standard, particularly
with respect to lack of justification." " He insisted that "a legislature is not
a court of law." " " Congress, unlike courts, must, and does, routinely draw
general conclusions-for example, of likely motive or of likely relationship
to legitimate need-from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this
kind, particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation." "102 Breyer
objected to the "extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the
Court appear[ed] to contemplate." "3 He continued:
Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the
Nation, assess the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an
appropriate remedy. Unlike courts, Congress directly reflects public
attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to understand where,
and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to
behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking
constitutional justification. Unlike judges, members of Congress
can directly obtain information from constituents who have
firsthand experience with discrimination and related issues."
The dissent concluded that "the Court, through its evidentiary demands, its
non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish between judicial and
legislative competencies, improperly invade[d] a power that the
Constitution assigns to Congress." 0 5
99. Id. at 374.
100. Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. Id at 379-80.
102. Id. at 380.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 384 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 388-89.
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III. POLITICAL SCIENCE, CONGRESS, AND THE
LEGISLATIVE DELIBERATION MODEL
Of the three models of due process of lawmaking identified in Part 1,
the federalism cases seem to demonstrate the recurring importance of one,
the emerging legislative deliberation model. The character of the legislative
process was a crucial issue in these cases. The search for evidence of a clear
goal, a documented need for governmental action, and a careful
consideration of alternative policies has led the Court far beyond the text of
the statutes into an excruciatingly fine-tuned examination of the record of
congressional action on the legislation. Judicial review has extended to an
evaluation of the quality of the legislative process.
The emerging standards of this kind of due process of lawmaking,
which we elaborate below, involve both substantive decisions (choice of
goals, evaluation of evidence, selection of policy means) and procedural
elements (deliberation on goals, evidence, and policy instruments must
occur, and the substantive decisions must be stated and justified in the
legislative record or in the statute). Particularly in light of the stringent
approach taken to congressional processes in Garrett, adherence to these
standards appears to be a necessary condition for overcoming constitutional
objections that would otherwise be dispositive.
In this Part, we examine the legislative deliberation model based on the
understanding of congressional decisionmaking processes found in the
social sciences. It would be unfair to criticize the Court for failing to
appreciate the latest cutting-edge disputes among scholarly students of
Congress. Our discussion avoids such matters. Instead, we present what we
believe to be basic, widely accepted conclusions of social science
concerning Congress. We find a startling divide between these principles
and the Court's apparent method of reviewing congressional action in the
federalism cases. 106
A. The Misleading Allure of Positive Political Theory
We begin with a word of caution. The new importance of the legislative
record naturally leads to a search for a universal theory of legislative
decisionmaking that might guide the analysis. Such a theory might tell us
whether the Court is right to be suspicious of congressional motivations and
106. As we explain in this Part, the empirically unsound and overly intrusive manner in
which the Court has imposed its due process of lawmaking model has caused one of us to abandon
his earlier speculation, see Frickey, supra'note 65, that legislative findings of fact and other
careful congressional processes might lead to a productive judicial-congressional dialogue on the
nature and limits of the constitutional power of both bodies. Of course, in the hands of a different
set of Justices, things might have worked out differently.
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fact-finding, whether the Court is asking too much of Congress when it
insists that the legislative record take a certain form, and whether the
legislative record can generate the information that the Court seeks. Legal
scholars may generally be aware of the development of public choice
theory-basically, the application of economic assumptions to political
analysis, under which scholars sometimes assume that interest groups
dominate the legislative process or that legislators are single-minded
seekers of reelection 07-and related exercises, and there may be a tendency
to "fill in the blank" by incorporating such an approach as the universal
understanding of how and why Congress behaves the way it does."~
The embrace of a universal positive theory would certainly simplify
judicial decisionmaking and legal scholarship. For example, if Congress
were deemed to be always under the thumb of powerful interest groups,
courts might be suspicious if state sovereignty was subordinated to benefit
such a group; if members were solely motivated by the desire for reelection,
courts might be suspicious of what appeared to be symbolic legislation. If
the "disability lobby" is, based on axiomatic theory, assumed to be
powerful, then Garrett might seem defensible: The lobby rolled over the
defenseless states as employers; adopting the ADA allowed members a
costless opportunity to vote on the side of virtue. If women's issues create
powerful dynamics in Congress, then Morrison might seem plausible: How
could the states stop an invasion of their local police power as against the
call to protect women from violence? To push the point even further, that
the attorneys general of thirty-eight states supported the passage of the
Violence Against Women Act"° becomes, in the face of axiomatic theory,
not evidence that the statute is a good idea and a welcome addition to the
states' legal arsenal of weapons to prevent such violence, but merely
additional evidence that elected officials will even abandon a principled
defense of their institutional interests to curry favor with powerful groups
and to be on the politically correct side of symbolic debates.
Although the Court has never clearly expressed such considerations, we
are concerned that they, in fact, may be in the Justices' minds.'"' After all,
why should we expect the Justices to be immune to the Congress-bashing
so common throughout our society?... Nonetheless, the assertions above
107. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 8.
108. It was precisely the fear that judges and legal scholars might too easily embrace
axiomatic formal theory about politics that led Dan Farber and one of us to undertake the project
that led to Law and Public Choice. See id.
109. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 653 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. One need not be a rocket scientist, or even a political scientist, to have such intuitions.
For example, many legal commentators "have noted" that Lopez "invalidated a pointless federal
crime enacted for symbolic or political reasons." Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity:
Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1049 & n. 158 (2000).
111. See Herbert Asher & Mike Barr, Popular Support for Congress and Its Members, in
CONGRESS, THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC 15 (Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein eds., 1994).
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about the disability lobby, women's groups, and the states cannot be taken
seriously without a careful assessment of the political power of the states as
lobbyists in Congress, the particular interest groups under scrutiny, and so
on." 2 The Court has not conducted a careful assessment or adopted a
coherent theory of lawmaking to guide its deliberations, either in the
abstract or as applied in any of these cases. We doubt that it is well situated
to do so in the future.
Leaving such inconveniences aside, the embrace of a universal formal
theory of congressional action would be wrongheaded in any event. In our
view of the state of political science, no theory of legislative
decisionmaking exists that is capable of addressing the issues adequately.
For example, positive political theories of legislative politics, which extend
well beyond public choice theory of the 1960s and 1970s, have become an
important branch of legislative scholarship in political science." 3 Positive
political theories treat legislators as instrumentalist and, given a set of
assumptions about the rules or institutional setting in which they operate,
deduce propositions about legislators' behavior, institutional choices, or
policy outcomes. There are a variety of positive theories of legislative
politics, however. They differ in assumptions about the political
motivations of legislators (policy, reelection, or progressive ambition) and
about the identity of other players relevant to goal achievement (the
President, interest groups, the electorate, the courts, and so on). They also
differ in what they seek to explain (individual voting behavior, the structure
of committees and parties, or policy outcomes). Simply stated, there is no
single positive political theory of legislative decisionmaking. Rather, a
variety of theories have emerged to address various aspects of legislative
politics.
Our approach reflects this state of affairs in the theory of legislative
decisionmaking.' 4 While there is reason to believe that members are at
least partly instrumental, it is unwise for us, or the courts, to attribute any
particular motivation to members of Congress. There is no basis, as a
general rule, to assume that interest groups, the electorate, parties, or any
other political actors dominate the legislative process.
In the absence of a single theoretical standard for evaluating the Court's
treatment of the legislative process, we turn to the more burdensome, but
112. For example, Bill Eskridge's study of instances in which Congress has overridden
Supreme Court decisions by statute found that states were among the most successful petitioners
for such congressional action, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 348-49 (1991).
113. See, e.g., Symposium, Positive Political Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457
(1992).
114. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional
Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 5 (Kenneth A. Shepsle &
Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. Ill: 17071730
Congressional Process
more useful, task of examining the institutional features of Congress in light
of the Court's opinions. We seek to engage the Court on its own terms by
demonstrating where the Court's apparent empirical claims about the
legislative process are incomplete or incorrect and its apparent prescriptions
are unpersuasive. We consider how the Court defines legislative actors and
the legislative record, whether Congress has the capacity to meet the
Court's expectations and whether it is desirable for it to do so, and the
consistency of the Justices' position in the federalism cases with their view
of the legislative record in statutory interpretation.
B. Who Are the Legislative Actors?
Congress never acts collectively and seldom acts alone. Each house acts
separately when it votes to approve or disapprove motions according to a
decision rule-by simple majority or supermajority. The President is an
Article I participant in the legislative process. Failure to account for these
distinctions creates a very distorted view of the legislative record. Some
background is required to appreciate fully the conceptual difficulties
created by the Court's approach in the federalism cases.
First, treating Congress as a unitary actor that contemplates evidence
and creates a legislative record is a convenient fiction, but it is only a
fiction. "Congress," like any other label for an institution comprised of
many individuals and subunits, has at least two connotations relevant to our
inquiry. First, Congress is a set of individuals-members and staff. These
individuals have attitudes, values, and preferences about public policy;
pursue political goals; and exhibit behaviors based on habit, the
expectations of others, or strategies.
Second, as an institution, Congress is a set of rules-formal and
informal. This is the common social scientific definition of "institution." In
the case of Congress, important rules are set in the Constitution, but most
rules are adopted by the two houses. The rules explicitly extend to the
support agencies of Congress-the Library of Congress, Congressional
Budget Office, General Accounting Office, and Government Printing
Office. The rules extend to semiformal groups of members, such as
legislative service organizations. They cover member and staff behavior in
and out of the legislative process and on and off Capitol Hill. When
common rules are imposed, as in the various budget acts establishing
special budget procedures, language is inserted to preserve the separate
rulemaking authority of the separate houses." 5 In this sense, we have two
115. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-577 (2000). The report states:
Congress adopts the provisions of this title-
(]) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules
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legislatures that must come into agreement before legislation is enrolled
(itself a term set by congressional rules).
When the Court asks whether Congress identified a history and pattern
of state misconduct, the Court presumably means, "Did some set of
members or staff identify a history and pattern?" The Court is seldom
precise and, we note below, it matters when the Court analyzes the
legislative record. Here we emphasize that the Court frequently confuses
whole and part. In Florida Prepaid, for example, the Court informed us that
"Congress itself said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state
remedies in the statute or in the Senate Report, and made only a few
fleeting references to state remedies in the House Report, essentially
repeating the testimony of the witnesses." 116 The reports, of course, are
committee reports, written pursuant to the rules of the two houses. Perhaps
the Court is giving Congress the benefit of the doubt by allowing committee
reports, as official publications, to speak for Congress when, at best, they
speak for a committee majority. More likely, the Court is using language
very loosely when it asserts that Congress did something in a committee
report.
Tightening up the terminology seems essential to the effective use of
the legislative record. We emphasize the two most important concerns.
First, Congress is bicameral. Bicameralism, which stands with
federalism and separation of powers as a structuring principle of the
Constitution, limits the utility of claims about what Congress said or did not
say. Relations between the House of Representatives and the Senate are
akin to relations between sovereign nations. Legislation cannot be imposed
by one house on the other. Mutual consent is required for legislation to be
adopted. Compromise between the houses is the norm for significant
legislation. The content of intercameral compromises may be only
tenuously connected to committee hearings and reports, or to the floor
debates that occur before passage of the legislation by each house.
It is important to note that the two houses seldom issue joint reports or
approve joint resolutions to explain their common perspectives on policy
questions. The explanations-committee reports, most prominently-are
the product of one house or the other but seldom of both, and they are
seldom intended for the other house. Indeed, each house has its own and
of each House, or of that House to which they specifically apply, and such rules shall
supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change those
rules (so far as they relate to that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the
same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.
id. at 23-24.
116. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644
(1999).
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somewhat distinctive requirement for the timely publication of committee
reports.
Even where it might be reasonable to argue that the acts of the House or
Senate are based on the identification of a history and pattern of state
behavior, there is little reason to assume that the compromises required to
resolve differences between the houses and the President will be justified in
the legislative record that precedes these agreements. Conference
committees do not conduct hearings or investigations and do not issue
background documents. Conference committee reports explain how
differences were resolved but are not accompanied by justifying documents
similar to the committee reports that accompany legislation to the floor for
initial consideration. Nor do bill managers usually submit new analytical
material for the record when a conference report is considered on the floor
of the House or Senate. As a general rule, then, we cannot expect a close
connection between the bicameral outcome and the evidence that either
house may have generated at earlier stages in the legislative process.
Second, with the exception of floor action, neither house acts
collectively. Responsibilities for most aspects of developing legislation are
delegated to individuals, or groups of individuals, in their capacities as
committee and party leaders. Individual members, with the assistance of
staff, inside and outside experts, the administration, interest groups, and
many others, introduce legislation. Committees hold hearings, mark up
measures, and vote to report legislation. Committee reports, required by
internal rules," 7 are written by staff with guidance from members. Material
that is inserted into hearing transcripts and testimony, and later into the
Congressional Record, is written by all manner of people. Legislation is
scheduled by negotiation among committee and party leaders, and, in the
House, often following action of the scheduling committee, the Rules
Committee. Floor statements are crafted by members and staff, and
sometimes outsiders. We could go on. The point is plain. Statements such
as "the Congress itself said nothing in the Senate [committee] report" are
misleading. If the Court wants to distinguish various congressional sources
of documentation, as it did in Garrett, then it must exercise greater care in
the attribution of congressional action and intent.
C. What Is the Legislative Record?
For the five Justices in the majority in these cases, the legislative record
appears to be delimited, but in a poorly defined way. Judging by the
117. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DoC. No. 106-320, R. XIII, at 586
(2001) [hereinafter RULES OF THE HOUSE]; STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-
15, R. XXVI, at 39 (2000) [hereinafter STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE].
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documents the majority has relied upon in the federalism cases, evidence of
congressional fact-finding may be found in three forms of congressional
publications: floor debate, as reported in the Congressional Record;
exchanges between members and witnesses at committee or subcommittee
hearings, as reported in committee prints; and committee reports, which
under House and Senate rules generally must accompany legislation
reported from committee. We might infer that official, printed documents
are the only place in which the legislative record is found, but we cannot be
certain. We also might infer that the only relevant documents are those that
explicitly concern the specific legislation at hand-those documents based
on proceedings immediately preceding enactment and during the same
Congress.
Plainly, defining the legislative record is not an easy task. Several
issues deserve immediate attention.
First, there are two legislative records, a House and a Senate record
(and, we might argue, a presidential record). These records may not be
shared. House committee reports, for example, are not routinely distributed
to senators' offices. If the Court intends to impose a legislative record
standard on Congress, it is reasonable to demand that an adequate
legislative record be developed in both houses. To do otherwise is to allow
one house to act constitutionally while the other does not. Majority opinions
in the federalism cases demonstrate little awareness of these necessary
complications.
Second, in concluding that a committee report or other formal
documentation represents findings of Congress, the Court must assume that
the members of the floor majority endorse the interpretation of evidence
reflected in the report. This assumption is unwarranted. The legislation may
have been amended before final passage in ways that are inconsistent with,
or irrelevant to, the findings previously documented. When the committee
bill is adopted unamended, the majority may be comprised of members with
widely varying policy goals and sharply differing views of the findings.
Unless the findings are rehearsed in the bill, a majority never endorses the
findings documented in the committee record, and such an endorsement
would hardly be evidence of a consensus of interpretation of those findings.
Third, legislative history is much richer than the legislative record.
Much of the information from outside sources-the executive branch,
interest groups, or independent experts-is communicated outside of
hearings and may not be repeated on the floor of the House or Senate.
Beyond committee hearing testimony and committee reports, members
have at their disposal written documents drafted in party leadership offices,
congressional support agencies, and members' caucuses, and by committee
and personal staff. The analyses of many of these sources, including those
of the Congressional Research Service, are provided to members on a
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confidential basis. As other observers have noted, informal communications
are vital to the legislative process."' Moreover, individual members are
exposed to the informal testimony of constituents, lobbyists, and many
others in their everyday activities. And, crucially, the information
cumulates over many years, often, if not typically, long before a particular
measure is debated and enacted.
Fourth, even if the legislative record is defined as the formal record,
Garrett illustrates the remaining ambiguities. In Garrett, as in other
federalism cases, the Court appeared to accept committee reports, which are
usually written by staff, as a potential source of pattern identification.
However, the Court rejected the report of a task force appointed by the
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Select Education. The Court failed
to mention that the task force report at issue (entitled From ADA to
Empowerment: The Report of the Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities) was printed by the
Government Printing Office at the request of the House Subcommittee on
Select Education." 9 The Court might have asserted that committee reports
reflect majority views, while other forms of committee prints are published
for convenience and do not reflect a policy statement by the committee
majority. The Court did not express any such conclusion. Indeed, if the
point is to identify the information at Congress's disposal, a committee
print would seem to be a strong indication of official cognizance. Both the
committee report and the task force report, we have every reason to believe,
were intended to be read by interested members, staff, and outsiders. A case
could be made that the report of a task force authorized for such a specific
purpose is more likely to be noticed by members and staff than a routine
committee report prepared days before floor action on an important
measure. Moreover, in this instance the work of the task force was
substantial: It held hearings in each state, attended by more than 30,000
people, and collected numerous examples of apparent disparate treatment of
persons with disabilities. 2 ' Thus, whether the concern was with formality
or substance, it seems hard to understand why the task force report was
treated so dismissively.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court appeared to allow committee testimony
as a potential source of pattern identification.12' Combined with the implicit
118. JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994); JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING
DECISIONS (1973); DONALD R. MATrHEWS & JAMES A. STIMSON, YEAS AND NAYS: NORMAL
DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1975).
119. TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES,
FROM ADA TO EMPOWERMENT (1990), cited in Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
120. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 380-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
121. 527 U.S. at 643-44.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
17352002]
The Yale Law Journal
principle of Garrett, it appears that testimony by administration officials,
interest-group representatives, or others, printed by action of a committee or
subcommittee, will be treated as a stronger basis than a task force report,
also printed by action of a subcommittee, for measuring congressional
identification of a policy problem. The Court offered no rationale for this
disparate treatment of congressional documents. Congressional officials
dealing with pending bills and counsel in future cases can only speculate
about whether this treatment of source material was largely inadvertent or,
in contrast, has future significance-and if so, what rationale might support
it.
Finally, the Court has ignored the President and the executive branch.
Under Article I, of course, the House and Senate are joined by the President
in the legislative process. Indeed, if the constitutionality of statutes
sometimes turns on the legislative record, it is difficult to justify the
exclusion of information that might have been at the disposal of the
President and, through the President and the representatives of the
executive branch, to Congress. An argument could be made that to be
deemed relevant to Congress, executive branch evidence must find its way
into the official publications of Congress, but such an argument would
represent a wildly unrealistic view of the communications between the
branches. Private correspondence and memoranda, presidential and cabinet
press conferences and press releases, executive branch studies, and other
means of communication are a part of interbranch communications on all
important measures.
In short, the Court has failed to define the legislative record and
expressed no appreciation of why this omission is a crucial problem with its
analysis. Implicitly, the Court has suggested that committee reports and
hearings supply the essential record, but the Court has offered no rationale
for excluding some congressional documents but not others. A coherent
rationale must account for bicameralism, while also allowing for the
possibility of a breadth of forms of evidence that is legislative and
extralegislative in origin.
D. Does Congress Have the Capacity To Meet the Court's Expectations
in Record-Building?
Several scholarly commentaries on the federalism cases have claimed
that the Court's expectations for Congress are unrealistic.'22 A cynic-not a
rare breed among legal scholars who criticize the Court-might suggest that
the Court intends that Congress cannot meet its new standard, thereby
dooming congressional efforts to infringe on the rights and powers of the
122. See sources cited supra note 7.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1736 [Vol. Ill: 1707
Congressional Process
states on procedural grounds, leaving the Court the face-saving assertion
that it has placed no serious substantive barriers in Congress's way. We
believe that a somewhat more balanced perspective is required. In fact, the
two houses of Congress have established expectations for themselves that
are not too unlike the legislative record standards implied by the Court. As
we explain, however, that Congress may be capable of doing some of the
things the Court seems to require is, in itself, no reason why Congress
should be required to do them and no guarantee that congressional
satisfaction of the Court's demands will foster rather than undermine the
creation of sound legislation.
Three features of congressional rules reflect expectations that members
of Congress have established for their own decisionmaking processes: the
requirements for committee reports, the oversight responsibilities of
committees, and the assigned responsibilities of the congressional support
agencies. Each of these deserves brief mention.
The committee report rules come close to requiring what the Court has
been demanding in the federalism cases. The rules date to the legislative
reorganization acts of 1946 and 1970, which were written to enhance the
information available to members.'23 Both House Rule XIII and Senate
Rule XXVI require that a committee report on a public bill or resolution
* be filed within seven days of a request by a majority of the
committee;
* include all supplemental, minority, or additional views;
* include cost estimates; and
* include a comparison of the existing and proposed laws. 24
The House rule further requires the inclusion of a statement of general
performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and
objectives, and a statement citing the specific powers granted to Congress
in the Constitution to enact the law proposed."5 The Senate rule specifies
that the report include a statement of the regulatory impact of the
legislation." 6 Special requirements apply to the appropriations committees
and the House Rules and Ways and Means Committees.'27
123. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AGAINST ITSELF 1-17
(1977).
124. RULES OF THE HOUSE, supra note 117, R. XIII, cl. 3, at 592-602; STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE, supra note 117, R. XXVI, cls. 10-12, at 46-49.
125. RULES OF THE HOUSE, supra note 117, R. XIII, cl. 3, at 593-97.
126. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 117, R. XXVI, cl. 11, at 48.
127. RULES OF THE HOUSE, supra note 117, R. XIII, cl. 3, at 599-602.
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With some exceptions, House Rule XIII, clause 4, provides:
It shall not be in order to consider in the House a measure or matter
reported by a committee until the third calendar day (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays except when the House is in
session on such a day) on which each report of a committee on that
measure or matter has been available .... 28
Furthermore, the rule states that a "committee that reports a measure or
matter shall make every reasonable effort to have its hearings thereon (if
any) printed and available for distribution." 29
Senate Rule XVII requires that the report be available for two days and
has the same rule on the availability of printed hearings. 3 ' Points of order
raised on the basis of these rules can be waived by special rule or
unanimous consent by the House, or by unanimous consent in the Senate,
and, of course, either house may change its rules.
Since 1946, congressional committees have been assigned explicit
oversight responsibilities. These responsibilities are broad. House Rule X,
clause 2, requires each House committee to "review and study on a
continuing basis... any conditions or circumstances that may indicate the
necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation addressing
subjects within its jurisdiction." 1'3 The rule also requires each committee to
"review specific problems with Federal rules, regulations, statutes, and
court decisions that are ambiguous, arbitrary, or nonsensical." '32 Senate
Rule XXV requires committees to "study and review, on a comprehensive
basis, matters relating" to their jurisdictions.'33 Rule XXV also requires that
the Committee on Rules and Administration "identify any court proceeding
or action which, in the opinion of the Committee, is of vital interest to the
Congress as a constitutionally established institution of the Federal
Government and call such proceeding or action to the attention of the
Senate." "3
Finally, Congress has created support agencies-the Congressional
Budget Office, the Library of Congress and its Congressional Research
Service, and the General Accounting Office-for, among other purposes,
conducting studies and reporting to Congress. Studies are often reported in
official publications, but analytical results also are reported on a
confidential basis to individual members of Congress. The Congressional
128. Id. R. XIII, cl. 4, at 602.
129. Id. R. XIII, cl. 4, at 603.
130. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 117, R. XVII, c. 5, at 17.
131. RULES OF THE HOUSE, supra note 117, R. X, c. 2, at 461-62.
132. Id. R. X, cl. 2, at 463.
133. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 117, R. XXV, c. 1, at 34.
134. Id. R. XXVH, at 49.
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Research Service is formally charged with wide-ranging data-gathering and
analytical responsibilities:
It shall be the duty of the Congressional Research Service, without
partisan bias-
(1) upon request, to advise and assist any committee of the Senate
or House of Representatives and any joint committee of Congress
in the analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of legislative proposals
within that committee's jurisdiction, or of recommendations
submitted to Congress, by the President or any executive agency, so
as to assist the committee in-
(A) determining the advisability of enacting such proposals;
(B) estimating the probable results of such proposals and
alternatives thereto; and
(C) evaluating alternative methods for accomplishing those
results;
and, by providing such other research and analytical services as the
committee considers appropriate for these purposes, otherwise to
assist in furnishing a basis for the proper evaluation and
determination of legislative proposals and recommendations
generally; and in the performance of this duty the Service shall
have authority, when so authorized by a committee and acting as
the agent of that committee, to request of any department or agency
of the United States the production of such books, records,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents as the Service
considers necessary, and such department or agency of the United
States shall comply with such request; and further, in the
performance of this and any other relevant duty, the Service shall
maintain continuous liaison with all committees . 13.
Moreover, the Congressional Research Service is authorized
upon request, or upon its own initiative in anticipation of requests,
to collect, classify, and analyze in the form of studies, reports,
compilations, digests, bulletins, indexes, translations, and
otherwise, data having a bearing on legislation, and to make such
data available and serviceable to committees and Members of the
135. 2 U.S.C. § 166(d)(1) (1994).
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Senate and House of Representatives and joint committees of
Congress. 136
Of course, the support agencies have responsibilities that extend far beyond
conducting analyses for members and committees. Still, Congress has
created for itself remarkable data-gathering and analytical capability.
Combined, the three agencies spend nearly $475 million annually.'37
Plainly, members of Congress have set high expectations for their own
decisionmaking process. A wide variety of resources, unmatched by any
other legislature of the world, are at the disposal of members and their
committees. The issue, therefore, is not whether Congress is capable of
gathering pertinent information, such as that on state conduct, when it
exercises Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority. Indeed, the modem
Congress has created information-gathering mechanisms and established
some procedures that might seem to establish a lawmaking process that
approximates the standards of deliberative due process. At least some of the
necessary conditions for deliberative due process of lawmaking appear to
be in place. In reality, however, they may not be sufficient to satisfy the
Court's demands, which seem to go beyond gathering of information to
justifying how that information influences public policy. The concern is
whether Congress uses the information in a rational policymaking process,
as the Court implies that it must, or in a competitive, political legislative
process, in which the role of information is very different. We now turn to
that issue.
E. Is the Kind of Deliberation Demanded by the Court Desirable?
In the federalism cases, the Court expects Congress to reyeal
information about its policy goals, about the objective facts that are brought
to the attention of its members, and about its constitutional and causal
reasoning, and to do so in the statute or in its formal legislative record. In
our view, this is clearly undesirable for a competitive legislative process.
The Court makes explicit that it uses the legislative record to infer the
"reasons for Congress' action." 138 Inferences about reasons might be drawn
from explicit statements by members about their reasons. In Kimel, the
Court complained that it found only a few "assorted
sentences... cobble[d] together from a decade's worth of congressional
reports and floor debates." 39 In all of the federalism cases, the Court has
sought evidence of state misconduct that members of Congress were likely
136. Id. § 166(d)(4).
137. S. REP. NO. 106-75, at 25, 31, 36 (1999).
138. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,88 (2000).
139. Id. at 89.
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to have considered. It is not clear what standard is applied: Would more
numerous direct statements by members or groups of members (such as
committees), or more formal findings reported in the statute, be sufficient?
Must the evidence be found in the record so that the Court can evaluate it,
whatever the reasons members offered for the record? Or, must the Court
be persuaded that (1) the evidence was available, and (2) members of
Congress deliberated on it? Although the Court's lack of clarity makes the
inquiry necessarily speculative, the latter interpretation is at least a
reasonable inference from the statements we can cobble together from the
cases."4 The Court's language surely indicates that Congress must provide
a factual record that the Court accepts as documenting that Congress has
legitimately invoked the Section 5 power. Whether Congress creates the
record and the Court makes the findings after due deliberation, or whether
Congress does both, strikes us as a distinction without much difference,
because there is no way to construct an acceptable record without working
backward from the legal standard specifying what facts are necessary to
support what findings. In any event, the language indicates that Congress is
on safest ground when it both constructs a record and makes findings
through the same application of deliberative constitutional standards that
the Court will apply later in litigation challenging the constitutionality of
the statute. Otherwise Congress is at peril that the Court will conclude, as it
did in Kimel, that the statute was an "unwarranted response" to an
"inconsequential problem." 14
For students of public policy, political science, and public
administration, these potential emerging criteria for due process of
140. Perhaps the most explicit indications come from Kimel, where the Court complained:
Our examination of the ADEA's legislative record confirms that Congress' 1974
extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem. Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of
constitutional violation....
[. [T]he United States' argument that Congress found substantial age
discrimination in the private sector... is beside the point. Congress made no such
findings with respect to the States. Although we also have doubts whether the findings
Congress did make with respect to the private sector could be extrapolated to support a
finding of unconstitutional age discrimination in the public sector, it is sufficient for
these cases to note that Congress failed to identify a widespread pattern of age
discrimination by the States....
A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that Congress
had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. Although
that lack of support is not determinative of the § 5 inquiry [citing Boerne], Congress'
failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination here
confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was
necessary in this field.
Id. at 89-91 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 89.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2002]
The Yale Law Journal
deliberative legislative lawmaking have a familiar ring to them. They are
characteristics of what are sometimes labeled rational policymaking
processes, which have been subject to extensive analysis and commentary.
For example, Yehezkel Dror observed that policymaking was lagging
behind policy knowledge (knowledge about issues, how to study them, and
how to address them).'42 He called for the application of an optimal model
of policymaking, which involves the application of scientific method to
policy analysis and choice. Theodore Lowi complained that interest-group
influence dominated policymaking and produced broad delegations of
power to executive agencies that allowed interest groups to dominate the
process of policy implementation. 143 He advocated "juridical democracy,"
which he defined as "the rule of law" operating in institutions. 44 In a
juridical democracy, statutes specify clear policy goals, rules of
implementation, and standards for evaluating performance. Thus, the
hallmarks of juridical democracy are specificity, adherence to formal
decisionmaking procedures, explicit consideration of the implications of
legislation for larger principles of justice, and limited delegation. 45
The formulations of Dror and Lowi have generated reactions that form
a substantial body of literature in policy analysis and political science. For
example, James Q. Wilson observed that some policy tasks are inherently
ambiguous and that conflicting but desirable goals often produce legislation
with unspecified tradeoffs."4 Prohibiting law that reflects ambiguous or
conflicting goals prevents a policy response in many situations. One of the
most basic legislative facts is that insistence on statutory clarity of ends and
means requires a reduction in the role of politics. Standards of rational
policymaking threaten important features of democratic policymaking-the
system of representation, interest-group activism, and bargaining as the
central form of decisionmaking. Wilson insisted that calculations of
planning and clear choices are the realm of administrators, not legislators.
Wilson's comments were directed at Lowi's juridical democracy, not
the Court's new due process of lawmaking. Still, their object-the nature of
congressional decisionmaking-is the same. The questions raised by
Wilson about the purpose of legislating, the nature of policy goals and
means-ends relations, and the tradeoffs between democratic and rational
decisionmaking are the same questions to be asked about the legislative
process suggested by the Court.
142. YEHEZKEL DROR, PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED (1968).
143. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 128-57 (1969).
144. Id. at 297.
145. Id. at 297-314.
146. See James Q. Wilson, Juridical Democracy Versus American Democracy, 23 PS: POL.
SC. & POL. 570,571 (1990).
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Perhaps, on a generous reading of the opinions, the Court has not
imposed a particular model of decisionmaking on Congress; instead, it is
only expecting justification for action somewhere in the legislative record.
It nonetheless remains clear that the Court has assumed a particular view of
legislative decisionmaking. In our judgment, this point of view is
inconsistent with the most plausible understanding of the legislative
process; at a minimum, it is contested.
The Court appears to assume a deliberative legislature, where
deliberation is defined as reasoned discussion in which the outcome is
consensus on ends and means. Joshua Cohen defines deliberation in a
similar way.'47 For Cohen, deliberation aims to develop a "rationally
motivated consensus-to find reasons that are persuasive to all." 148 It might
be objected that the Court never insists on a consensus, but the Court is
demanding reasons that it finds persuasive, at least when Congress's actions
would otherwise infringe on the rights or powers of states. And the Court is
demanding revelation of those persuasive reasons, and the data to support
them, in the legislative record.
Deliberation and the expectation that Congress engage in it have
undeniable intuitive appeal, particularly with respect to efforts to balance
constitutional values. Theorists often juxtapose deliberation and voting as
modes of decisionmaking. For example, Cass Sunstein has stated:
To be sure, there are notorious difficulties in the claim that political
outcomes can actually reflect the "public will." It is doubtful that
private desires or even aspirations can be well-aggregated through
the process of majority rule. Even if a process of aggregation were
possible, it would not be entirely desirable in light of the broader
goals of deliberation in producing reasoned agreement rather than
simple aggregation.149
In the federalism cases, the Court seems to agree. At least for policies in
which constitutional values must be weighed with care, the Court seems to
suggest that deliberation, not simple aggregation, is expected of Congress.
Congressional decisionmaking, however, is not, and should not be, an
exclusively deliberative process. The empirical and normative claims
warrant some discussion.
The empirical claim that congressional decisionmaking is not
exclusively a deliberative process follows from the constitutionally imposed
constraints to which we have alluded. Each house decides by voting, and
147. See Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy, SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y, Spring 1989, at 25, 32-33.
148. Id. at 33.
149. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 244 (1993)
(citations omitted).
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three institutional players-the House, the Senate, and the President-
generally must concur before policy is enacted. Voting implies that winners
and losers are expected, even with respect to the choice of rules that govern
deliberation and voting. The time devoted to deliberation and the subject
matter of deliberation are, or may be, limited by rule.
Students of deliberation have observed that successful deliberation is
contingent on a commonality of interests or values to be pursued in public
policy. 5 ' If a commonality of interests or values does not exist, discussion
will take the form of debate,' decisions will be made by vote rather than
by consensus, and the process will take the form of building majority
coalitions through a variety of means rather than persuasion on the merits.
The process of building majorities or supermajorities under conditions of a
conflict of interests generates competition. Competition, in turn, produces
strategies that undermine the purposes of deliberation. Legislators may
reveal incomplete or misleading information about their own goals,
objective conditions, or causal reasoning. Strategic disclosure muddies the
legislative record and greatly complicates the task of applying a legal
standard that asks judges to evaluate the quality of that record.
The Court might believe that Congress has an obligation to bar or limit
deceptive behavior, at least when legislating on matters of the kind at issue
in the recent federalism cases. Deception, after all, may be inconsistent with
deliberation-deception undermines the effort to arrive at reasoned
agreement about the public interest or will. Deception surely undermines
the Court's ability to evaluate the reasons for action articulated by
legislators and found in the legislative record. But however attractive
deliberation might be, judicially imposed limitations on deception to
promote deliberation are hopelessly unrealistic. They would also put the
Court in a position of attempting to dictate rules to Congress, in tension
with the right of each house to determine its own rules. 52
We have noted that the constitutional structure of the legislative process
may produce compromises on both ends and means. We might hope that
interaction among the House, Senate, and President will take a deliberative
form and yield a reasoned agreement. The Constitution does not, however,
specify any process for this interaction. Conference committees, which are
not mentioned in the Constitution, are not required to produce detailed
reports, as are House and Senate committees, and never do.
150. See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 4 (1980); Adam
Przeworski, Deliberation and Ideological Domination, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 140, 154-
55 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
151. See STEVEN S. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE
237-40 (1989).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
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The Court expects Congress to legislate differently when its exercise of
Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority threatens states' rights. When
there is little conflict of interests within Congress, it is easy to see how
congressional action, even with bicameralism and a process that builds
majority decisions, might be improved to meet the Court's expectations.
However, when conflict of interests is present and when policy is therefore
constructed through a competitive process of coalition building, bargaining,
and voting, the Court is asking too much. It is demanding more than a
statute, which is a legislative outcome, that meets constitutional standards.
It is requiring that a bargaining process have the major features of a
hypothetical rational policymaking process. It is demanding that the
legislative process become something it is not and cannot be in a system of
competitive parties operating through several institutions with shared
policymaking responsibilities.
A caveat is in order. Because the Court's opinions are so unclear, it
may be that we have overestimated what it has begun to require of
Congress. Perhaps the Court itself will undertake the responsibility of
weighing the evidence and is merely requiring Congress to assemble the
factual basis for judicial review. On this understanding, Congress must
build a record, but need not demonstrate that the statute it has passed is the
product of a rational, deliberative policymaking process.
As we have explained,'53 Congress undoubtedly has the capacity to
build a record, and the Court's decisions will impel interest groups to see to
it that Congress does so more elaborately in future legislation. There is only
a fine line, however, between record-building and deliberation. Without a
sense for what will fly in the Court-what will pass judicial deliberative
muster-record-building will be largely ineffective. In short, the record will
have to be shaped to satisfy deliberation, whether congressional or judicial,
and somewhere in the congressional process some actors must exercise
judgment concerning what to include or exclude. Moreover, if the only
record that will satisfy the Court is one that it is impossible for Congress to
build, the exercise is a hollow one. Finally, because the remedy provided by
the statute must not simply be logically linked to the factual basis for it, but
must also meet the stringent requirements of congruence and
proportionality, a deliberative tailoring process will occur somewhere
outside the Court-by interest groups, congressional staff, members of
Congress, and others. The only hope to save the proposed statute from
judicial invalidation is to duplicate the Court's deliberative processes. If
that is done, it would be unsurprising to have that revealed in the legislative
history as the "deliberative" outcome of congressional processes.
153. See supra Section lII.D.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
17452002]
The Yale Law Journal
F. The Court's Methodology, Other Potentially Analogous Cases, and
Separation-of-Powers Values
Our critique of the Court's approach in the federalism cases has been
largely descriptive: The judicially imposed procedural lawmaking
obligations are inconsistent with any sophisticated understanding of
congressional processes. Does this similarly indict the Court's requirement
that, when Congress seemingly trenches upon established constitutional
values' - or uses its supposed plenary authority over novel concerns in ways
that would violate the Constitution if applied elsewhere, 15  the statute must
unmistakably commit Congress to trenching upon such values?
Whether the other models of due process of lawmaking and statutory
interpretation are consistent with our best understanding of legislative
action is a subject for further study. Our tentative view is that there are
important distinctions between these longstanding approaches and the new
judicially proceduralized protection of federalism. In the former, the Court
is obviously protecting substantive values: free speech, equality, Indian
property rights, and the like. The approach is often bound up with another
longstanding technique, which is to prefer constitutional to unconstitutional
readings of statutes.156 This seems straightforward enough when the Court
will actually enforce the constitutional provisions, if push comes to shove.
It may be harder to rationalize in novel areas like immigration law and
Indian law, in which the Court almost always will ultimately defer to
Congress. But here, too, there are significant substantive values at stake: the
freedom of the immigrant from indefinite detention, the freedom of the tribe
from the divestment of its historical prerogatives, and so on. These values,
as well, have a constitutional dimension, but because of the unusual
circumstances of these areas, judges have often viewed them as involving
questions best left for Congress to have the final say. In short, the
Constitution can mean more than what the Court will enforce. Although the
Court may view itself as inferior to Congress in having the last say on such
questions as immigration and Indian policy, the Court may very well
consider itself well situated to force Congress to do any dirty work
explicitly, to articulate clearly an institutional rationale for all the public to
see to justify what may seem to be harsh or irrational measures.
Oddly, for a time it appeared that the Court would be satisfied taking
precisely this approach to the protection of federalism. As alluded to
154. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31 (discussing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong and
Kent v. Dulles).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41 (discussing congressional power over
immigration and Indian affairs).
156. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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earlier,157 a decade ago the Court imposed no substantive constitutional
limits on congressional intrusions upon the states, but subjected
congressional exercises of its commerce power regulating core state
functions,'58 federal statutes subjecting states to suit in federal court, 59 and
federal measures conditioning federal grants upon compliance with federal
regulation"6 to a stringent clear-statement requirement, whereby the state
avoided the federal invasion unless the measure spoke with absolute clarity.
Although there are normative concerns about judicial imposition of these
requirements retroactively to statutes passed in earlier times when Congress
lacked notice of these rules, 161 we have no serious descriptive quarrel with
this technique. Congress, as an institution, can be put on notice that it must
speak clearly in statutory language to achieve certain goals. Moreover, as
one of us has explained, there are potential benefits to this approach:
This approach has significant institutional implications both for the
Court and for Congress. It provides the Court with a structural
lodestar to cut through the complexities of a difficult statutory case.
The state [or tribe, or immigrant] gets the benefit of a strong
presumption in favor of its sovereignty [or other interest], and the
opposing party bears the burden of marshalling the legal
complexities and finding clear evidence of congressional support
for its position. If, as is often the case, state sovereignty survives
the challenge, the burden of combating inertia and seeking legal
change lies with the party who sought to intrude upon state
authority. If this party undertakes the lobbying effort necessary to
obtain federal legislation to overturn the Court's decision, it must
do so openly, by clear language in a bill. In theory, at least, this
approach encourages a fair fight in Congress, which is structurally
better suited than the Court to weigh state sovereignty against other
interests. Because it is much easier to kill legislation than to pass it,
states ultimately retain all the institutional and procedural
advantages in conflicts over their sovereignty, but Congress retains
the capacity to erode state sovereignty whenever the national
interest is sufficiently strong.
62
What has changed since the early 1990s concerning federalism? Two
things strike us as significant, and distinguishable in important ways from
the immigration and Indian cases: The Court no longer defers to clear
congressional judgments, and the Court seems to insist that Congress must
157. See supra text accompanying notes 47-59.
158. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
159. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
160. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1981).
161. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 33, at 638-40.
162. Frickey, supra note 41, at 416 (citations omitted).
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provide a formal record providing a strong factual basis for a reasoned
judgment. The implication is that more facts might change things. But we
think the Court had it right in the first place: require Congress to make
explicit its regulation, and then impose whatever substantive, not
procedural, limitations the Court finds mandated by the Constitution.
In the Commerce Clause area, this movement back to substantive
standards is already evident. As described earlier, 63 in Morrison the Court
seemingly concluded that legislative jurisdiction for regulation under the
Commerce Clause requires some sort of economic activity. Whatever might
be wrong with this as a substantive matter of constitutional law, it is
apparent that more facts about how violence against women or gun violence
in schools indirectly affects interstate commerce would not have changed
the results in Morrison or Lopez. Nor would a more sanitized,
administrative-agency-like legislative process."
Of course, even this preferred approach is worrisome. We mean no
endorsement of Morrison as a substantive matter, only to suggest that the
battle over Morrison and other similar controversies should be fought over
substance, not facts or procedure. A primary problem is whether the Court
can construct substantive tests that are clear enough to provide fair notice to
Congress and lower courts, and that are not merely arbitrary. As Justice
Souter argued in his dissent in Lopez, the Court's pre-1936 track record on
substantive tests limiting congressional commerce power-under which
manufacturing was not "commerce" and Congress could regulate "direct"
but not "indirect" effects upon interstate commerce-was dismal and is
today almost universally seen as failed, dangerous judicial intermeddling to
163. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
164. To be sure, one can imagine factual issues arising in the next wave of Commerce Clause
cases. Hypothetically, assume that Congress enacts legislation requiring all lemonade stands with
annual revenues of ten dollars or more that are operated by underage entrepreneurs to use beet
sugar rather than cane sugar. There are plenty of transactions upon which to hang the legislative
jurisdictional hook, but the overall scheme, even when all such operations are aggregated, would
have a minuscule effect upon interstate commerce. After all, in contrast to Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which there clearly existed an integrated, interstate wheat market that
would be dramatically affected by the personal consumption of thousands of wheat producers, no
such widespread, integrated, interstate market seems affected by the hypothetical statute. If one
doubted the important effects of the wheat regulation statute, explicit congressional factual
findings could explain Congress's rationale and provide all interested parties-farmers fighting
for or against the bill, public interest organizations, and lawyers and judges in any later
litigation-a sense of what Congress had institutionally committed itself to endorsing. Consider
how ludicrous such findings would appear in our hypothetical "lemonade reform" act. We would
trust the congressional process to flush out such measures, which suggests that, in certain
circumstances, factual findings or a clear-statement requirement can be useful judicial tools in
assisting good congressional policymaking. If Congress enacts silly legislation justified by
ridiculous findings, what then? It seems odd for the Court, as it has done, to suggest that Congress
should be faulted as a matter of fact. Instead, the Court, if honest, faces a purely substantive
question: Should it defer to such a poor congressional rationale, or should it reject it as beyond
congressional power? The Court has already recognized this in Morrison, and we would expect it
to move away from factual quarrels and toward more substantive standards in other areas as well.
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preserve nineteenth-century laissez-faire conceptions of economic freedom
and states' rights against the inexorable force of modernity in the face of
economic crisis.' It is on this question of substantive standards that future
disputes must turn.
The problem of developing substantive standards is particularly acute in
the Section 5 cases. Because the Court has tied congressional power under
Section 5 to remedying what the Court itself deems a pattern of
unconstitutional state action, congressional power is linked to endless,
gauzy, unresolvable sociological disputes about what is happening in the
real world of state government treatment of its own employees, disabled
citizens, and so on. One would have thought that such disputes are the
quintessential legislative, not judicial, questions. A defense is that they are,
but that under our system they are state legislative questions, not
congressional ones. We have some sympathy for this point, but again
wonder whether the Court can ever find a way to operationalize this
concern through a substantive standard that avoids the pitfalls that we have
identified.
The Court is now perilously close to saying that Congress, under
Section 5, may outlaw state action only when "everybody knows" that the
states, or a region of states, routinely abuse constitutional rights in a certain
way. The Court has consistently pointed back to the legislative history of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a paradigmatic example of the kind of
lawmaking Congress may undertake.'66 That legislative history was replete
with example upon example of blatant discrimination in voting that was
inexplicable on any ground other than pure racial animus. If that is what the
current Court is asking of the current Congress concerning current
controversies, Congress might as well close up shop. Our society has
moved well beyond such egregious regional norms, and in any event, state
decisionmakers today are sophisticated enough not to allow their missteps
to be documented.
While the Court is attempting to fine-tune its substantive limits on
Congress, it ought to consider some for itself. Its proceduralized,
supposedly fact-based, legislative record approach in the federalism cases
seems inconsistent with its own trend in statutory interpretation, where
legislative history has been systematically devalued and statutory text
privileged. 67  More generally, the judicial intrusion into internal
congressional processes seems in tension with the Constitution itself, which
165. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-09 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 98.
167. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)); Philip P.
Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1999).
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provides that each house is responsible for making its own rules. 168 It is one
thing for the Court to enforce explicit constitutional prohibitions on
congressional lawmaking procedural innovation-as, for example, with the
legislative veto, 69 or with tax legislation that originated in the Senate rather
than the House. 70 These exercises of the procedural regularity model of due
process of lawmaking may well make sense.'71 It is quite another thing for
the Court to impose procedural obligations upon Congress going far beyond
the Constitution or the houses' own rules. There is a deep separation-of-
powers problem at the heart of what we perceive to be the new due-
deliberation model of due process of lawmaking.' The Court's efforts to
protect the structural values of federalism seem to flounder at their
intersection with our other major constitutional structural value, separation
of powers.
G. The Stability of the Court's Majority: Constitutional and Statutory
Cross- Trends
As discussed earlier, 7 3 the Supreme Court has used canons of statutory
interpretation based on constitutional values to impose heightened statutory
drafting obligations on Congress. For example, under the "super-strong"
clear-statement rules announced in such federalism cases as Gregory and
Atascadero, only very explicit text targeted to the issue in question is
sufficient to force the federal courts to conclude that Congress has sought to
regulate the states.'74 The Rehnquist Court has also promoted this
enthusiasm for statutory textual solutions by relying far less upon
legislative history in interpreting statutes. 7 Indeed, two members of the
current Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas, almost never consult legislative
history in construing a statute.'76 Instead of viewing legislative intent as the
touchstone of statutory meaning, these Justices seek to interpret the statute
merely by giving its text the meaning most consistent with ordinary
American English usage."' There are a variety of arguments supposedly
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
169. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
170. Cf. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990) (holding that a special
assessment statute is not a "Bill for raising Revenue" and consequently its origination in the
Senate does not violate the Origination Clause).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 12-22.
172. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 7, at 376-83.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 158-160.
175. For a recent examination, see Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court's Declining
Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
369 (1999).
176. See Frickey, supra note 167, at 205.
177. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting the meaning of language in a statute:
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supporting this "new textualism"--e.g., that legislative intent is an
oxymoron; that the only "law" is the text enacted bicamerally and signed
by the President; that judicial reliance on legislative history encourages
members and their staffs (and lobbyists with access to them) to stack
legislative history to skew later judicial interpretation; that consulting
legislative history allows willful judges to look over the materials and
selectively pick out those that support an outcome they wish to reach for
their own policy reasons, while ignoring contrary information.""
The Court's behavior seems paradoxical. The federalism cases suggest
that Congress must carefully craft legislative history and perhaps even
make formal findings, documenting a close connection between a federal
statute and interstate commerce or a pattern of state constitutional
violations. The legislative history is treated with high reverence. In contrast,
the new textualism has influenced the Court in statutory interpretation to
diminish the importance of legislative history, which is viewed as
strategically constructed and distorted. In our view, the former cases may
place responsibilities upon Congress that it simply cannot withstand-
forcing Congress to behave like an administrative agency, despite the
wildly different composition, structure, and goals of a legislature as
compared to an agency-while the statutory interpretation trend gives
congressional processes less respect than they deserve. The two lines of
cases seem at war with each other.
Of course, an alternative explanation exists, under which the Court
majority's enforcement of federalism values seems perilously short of the
sort of deliberation it seems to require of Congress. The paradox evaporates
when we view the Court through the lens it has created for scrutinizing
Congress. Obviously, the bare majority of five Justices would collapse if
only one Justice deserted. The majority's constitutional methodology of due
deliberation in congressional proceedings is so dramatically inconsistent
with the statutory interpretation methodology of two of the coalition
members that concerns about candor and strategic behavior are obvious.
Students of political science do not doubt that the Court, as a multimember
body deciding important public issues by a majority vote of highly
intelligent, strongly motivated, and highly ideological members, is a place
where not just deliberation, but also strategic behavior, occurs within a
stylized, complex institutional setting.'79 Our surmise is that two members
of the five-person majority have been silently joining opinions they
probably consider methodologically shoddy because they reach the "right"
first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context; and second, using
established canons of construction, ask whether there is any clear indication that some permissible
meaning other than the ordinary one applies."); SCALIA, supra note 167, at 14-37.
178. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
179. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6; MALTZMANN ET AL., supra note 6.
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answers. No majority can easily be formed at the moment to support any
other methodology reaching the same answers, and for whatever reason, for
these two the benefits of methodological purity are less than the price of the
doctrinal chaos that would result if they concurred in the judgment on the
basis of a new substantive constitutional limit of their creation and refused
to join the rationale of due legislative deliberation.
For present purposes, we are agnostic concerning the normative
questions surrounding our presumed strategic explanation for the coalition-
building in the federalism cases. The role of Justice on the current United
States Supreme Court comprises a host of personal, doctrinal, ideological,
institutional, self-defining, and other factors so as to defy any simple
normative regime. Justices are people; the Court is a complex, contentious,
hugely important institution; judicial interaction occurs in the real world of
policymaking, not the sanitized domain of political philosophy. No Justice
can write separately in every case where he or she has a quibble. Thus, we
do not ask of the Justices the impossible-to go beyond what thoughtful,
well-intentioned, hard-working people can reasonably do within their
institutional settings.
Our regret is that the Justices seem to be asking the impossible of
members of Congress. What the Court requires of them seems utterly
hollow when its performative utterances imposing the obligations of
deliberation and rational articulation and discounting compromise and
strategic behavior seem to fall victim to the Justices' own standards.
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
Congress can be expected to respond to the new legislative record
demands of the Court. We can expect members of Congress to do so in a
manner that largely meets the Court's expectations but that reflects the
competitive nature of legislative decisionmaking and minimizes transaction
and opportunity costs. The breadth of such efforts turns on an important
unknown: the future direction of the Court in the application of the implicit
standards of lawmaking. If the Court continues down the established path,
the open question will be whether the resulting changes in congressional
habits are desirable and, in the long run, whether the courts will be satisfied
with the implications for their deliberations.
To improve Congress's ability to anticipate the courts, Elizabeth
Garrett and Adrian Vermeule have suggested a two-step procedure for all
bills. 80 First, at the time of referral to committee, the parliamentarian would
identify potential constitutional issues raised by a bill. This may stimulate a
180. See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian
Congress, 50 DuKE U. 1277 (2001).
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committee to hold hearings that address those issues. Later, a bill reported
from committee would be accompanied by a "constitutional impact
statement." The statement would provide a summary of committee findings
on the proposal's constitutional implications. In this way, Congress will be
more likely to address the constitutional issues, and the legislative record
will reflect those deliberations. To assist Congress with this process, Garrett
and Vermeule propose strengthening the staff expertise available by
creating an Office for Constitutional Issues. Garrett and Vermeule would
enforce the proposed process by allowing points of order to be raised
against bills that lack the accompanying statement or that otherwise raise a
constitutional issue (currently allowed in the Senate but not the House).''
Garrett and Vermeule's proposal is intriguing. Our initial reaction,
however, is that it may not be necessary and in any event will be
exceedingly costly. As Garrett and Vermeule note, House committees are
required to account for constitutional implications in their reports." 2
Perhaps the Senate could require the same of its committees. Even without
the proposal, in light of the federalism cases, the framers of congressional
legislation and those lobbying for these bills will quickly recognize that
pushing the boundaries of Commerce Clause and Section 5 authority
necessitates the construction of a legislative record that meets the Court's
expectations. Scholars have predicted greater formalism in congressional
fact-finding activities and more frequent and detailed specification of
findings in legislation.'83 Both seem quite likely, although they do not
exhaust the probable responses.
In any event, the Court's demand for a particular kind of legislative
record has been limited so far to the domain of federalism. If applied to all
legislation, the burden on Congress would be great. Parliamentarians'
statements would have to be attached to each of the 12,000-plus bills that
are introduced in each Congress, and a constitutional impact statement
would have to be attached to each of the 2000-plus bills reported to the
floor.
If the Court's stance on review of the legislative record is maintained,
congressional advocates of new policy initiatives are likely to turn to
support agencies, the executive agencies, and other organizations for
studies that can be included in the legislative record. The number of
requests for formal studies from congressional support agencies will
increase, and soon Congress will consider substantial increases in financial
support. Special congressional task forces and commissions may be used
more frequently (assuming their work can find its way into the appropriate
181. Id. at 1317-30.
182. /d. at 1311.
183. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 7, at 158-59; Colker & Brudney, supra note 7, at
141-43.
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legislative record). And executive agencies will be required to conduct
more formal studies and provide reports to Congress in anticipation of
congressional action.
Moreover, advocates of policy initiatives will anticipate congressional
demand for such studies and will gladly propose and produce them. Indeed,
we can expect competing efforts to provide bases of findings of one's
choice, and corresponding efforts to debunk the fact-finding efforts of
competitors. Such competitive analytical efforts are common today, but
they take on new importance when they have implications for judicial
review of the new statutes. Courts are likely to be confronted with a
legislative record that is far more complicated and far more difficult to
evaluate than the record typically produced in the past. Committee
records-hearings, reports, special printings-will be expanded to
incorporate these studies.
The net result, of course, will not necessarily be a useful legislative
record-especially from the perspective of guiding judicial review. The
courts often will be confronted with a complex and inconsistent legislative
record. If the courts insist on the presence of persuasive evidence in the
legislative record of a pattern of state improprieties as a necessary condition
for congressional action, the courts will have to evaluate that record. This
will entail choosing among the competing sets of facts and interpretations.
Judges will be making rulings that read very much like the debating points
offered by the competing parties to the legislative battles.
Is there any way to short-circuit these burdens and still maintain
meaningful judicial review of legislative process? Neal Devins has
proposed that the courts develop a selection strategy in their scrutiny of the
legislative record:
On some issues, like those implicating separation of powers
concerns, Congress (at least sometimes) may well have the
institutional incentives to moderate its handiwork in order to
preserve the balance of powers. On other issues, like those dealing
with Congress's federalism-implicated powers, this investigation
may reveal that Congress's desire to do that which is politically
popular is far stronger than its desire to self-police its powers under
either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. By observing Congress this way, the Court can sort
out whether Congress has the institutional incentives to take
factfinding seriously.'"
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Devins suggests that, in general, where the incentives for competitive or
otherwise objective fact-finding are strong, the Court can exercise greater
deference to Congress; where the incentives seem weak, the Court can
pursue Garrett-style review.
Devins's proposal, it seems to us, asks the Court to make
generalizations about political processes across a range of policy areas that
it is not competent to make.185 It would add a layer of indeterminacy to
legal standards without addressing the weaknesses in the Garrett approach.
And, of course, it accepts the Court's position that at some point the Court
must second-guess Congress's collection and evaluation of social facts. In
our judgment, it would be more consistent with the judicial role for that
second-guessing to be based on clear statutory statements and substantive
standards rather than review of congressional process.
V. CONCLUSION
The emerging theory of due legislative deliberation lacks an adequate
conceptualization of legislative actors, has an excessively narrow definition
of the legislative record, and appears to reflect an inaccurate view of
deliberation and the legislative process. While Congress has the capacity to
meet the Court's expectations for evidence gathering, Congress cannot and
will not meet the Court's implicit assumptions about deliberation.
Our hunch is that eventually the Supreme Court will find the Garrett
approach untenable. It will recognize the pitfalls of legislative record
review, perhaps under pressure from the Justices in the majority coalition
who have generally considered legislative records unreliable for other
purposes. When it does, the five-member coalition will have a variety of
options. It could reverse the direction taken in the federalism cases.
Alternatively, it could insist on more detailed findings within the statutes
themselves, as well as more targeted statutory language, while abandoning
inquiry about congressional deliberation. The latter approach would
continue to provide a basis for judicial review, but without requiring the
courts to develop more explicit and detailed standards for the legislative
record. Assuming that the courts impose some constraint through the nature
of the findings or statement required in the statute, this approach would
represent a step back from the intrusive standards implied in the recent
federalism cases, while providing incentives to Congress to address states'
rights and interests directly and providing notice to the states that intrusive
legislation is under consideration, thereby raising the costs of such
185. See supra text accompanying notes 106-114 (urging courts to avoid adopting any
unitary, formal model of the political process as an easy way to develop a theory of judicial
review).
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legislation and providing the states a better opportunity to defeat it. Or the
Supreme Court could shift away from procedural review and adopt new, as-
yet-unknown substantive limits on congressional power, as it has already
begun to do in Morrison by suggesting that Congress may exercise its
Commerce Clause power only when regulating economic activity.
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